caddy/modules/caddytls/connpolicy.go

1005 lines
33 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2015 Matthew Holt and The Caddy Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package caddytls
import (
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/mholt/acmez/v2"
"go.uber.org/zap"
"go.uber.org/zap/zapcore"
"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/caddyconfig"
"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/caddyconfig/caddyfile"
)
func init() {
caddy.RegisterModule(LeafCertClientAuth{})
}
// ConnectionPolicies govern the establishment of TLS connections. It is
// an ordered group of connection policies; the first matching policy will
// be used to configure TLS connections at handshake-time.
type ConnectionPolicies []*ConnectionPolicy
// Provision sets up each connection policy. It should be called
// during the Validate() phase, after the TLS app (if any) is
// already set up.
func (cp ConnectionPolicies) Provision(ctx caddy.Context) error {
for i, pol := range cp {
// matchers
mods, err := ctx.LoadModule(pol, "MatchersRaw")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("loading handshake matchers: %v", err)
}
for _, modIface := range mods.(map[string]any) {
cp[i].matchers = append(cp[i].matchers, modIface.(ConnectionMatcher))
}
// enable HTTP/2 by default
if pol.ALPN == nil {
pol.ALPN = append(pol.ALPN, defaultALPN...)
}
// pre-build standard TLS config so we don't have to at handshake-time
err = pol.buildStandardTLSConfig(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("connection policy %d: building standard TLS config: %s", i, err)
}
if pol.ClientAuthentication != nil && len(pol.ClientAuthentication.VerifiersRaw) > 0 {
clientCertValidations, err := ctx.LoadModule(pol.ClientAuthentication, "VerifiersRaw")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("loading client cert verifiers: %v", err)
}
for _, validator := range clientCertValidations.([]any) {
cp[i].ClientAuthentication.verifiers = append(cp[i].ClientAuthentication.verifiers, validator.(ClientCertificateVerifier))
}
}
}
return nil
}
// TLSConfig returns a standard-lib-compatible TLS configuration which
// selects the first matching policy based on the ClientHello.
func (cp ConnectionPolicies) TLSConfig(_ caddy.Context) *tls.Config {
// using ServerName to match policies is extremely common, especially in configs
// with lots and lots of different policies; we can fast-track those by indexing
// them by SNI, so we don't have to iterate potentially thousands of policies
// (TODO: this map does not account for wildcards, see if this is a problem in practice? look for reports of high connection latency with wildcard certs but low latency for non-wildcards in multi-thousand-cert deployments)
indexedBySNI := make(map[string]ConnectionPolicies)
if len(cp) > 30 {
for _, p := range cp {
for _, m := range p.matchers {
if sni, ok := m.(MatchServerName); ok {
for _, sniName := range sni {
indexedBySNI[sniName] = append(indexedBySNI[sniName], p)
}
}
}
}
}
return &tls.Config{
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
GetConfigForClient: func(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) {
// filter policies by SNI first, if possible, to speed things up
// when there may be lots of policies
possiblePolicies := cp
if indexedPolicies, ok := indexedBySNI[hello.ServerName]; ok {
possiblePolicies = indexedPolicies
}
policyLoop:
for _, pol := range possiblePolicies {
for _, matcher := range pol.matchers {
if !matcher.Match(hello) {
continue policyLoop
}
}
if pol.Drop {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dropping connection")
}
return pol.TLSConfig, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no server TLS configuration available for ClientHello: %+v", hello)
},
}
}
// ConnectionPolicy specifies the logic for handling a TLS handshake.
// An empty policy is valid; safe and sensible defaults will be used.
type ConnectionPolicy struct {
// How to match this policy with a TLS ClientHello. If
// this policy is the first to match, it will be used.
MatchersRaw caddy.ModuleMap `json:"match,omitempty" caddy:"namespace=tls.handshake_match"`
// How to choose a certificate if more than one matched
// the given ServerName (SNI) value.
CertSelection *CustomCertSelectionPolicy `json:"certificate_selection,omitempty"`
// The list of cipher suites to support. Caddy's
// defaults are modern and secure.
CipherSuites []string `json:"cipher_suites,omitempty"`
// The list of elliptic curves to support. Caddy's
// defaults are modern and secure.
Curves []string `json:"curves,omitempty"`
// Protocols to use for Application-Layer Protocol
// Negotiation (ALPN) during the handshake.
ALPN []string `json:"alpn,omitempty"`
// Minimum TLS protocol version to allow. Default: `tls1.2`
ProtocolMin string `json:"protocol_min,omitempty"`
// Maximum TLS protocol version to allow. Default: `tls1.3`
ProtocolMax string `json:"protocol_max,omitempty"`
// Reject TLS connections. EXPERIMENTAL: May change.
Drop bool `json:"drop,omitempty"`
// Enables and configures TLS client authentication.
ClientAuthentication *ClientAuthentication `json:"client_authentication,omitempty"`
// DefaultSNI becomes the ServerName in a ClientHello if there
// is no policy configured for the empty SNI value.
DefaultSNI string `json:"default_sni,omitempty"`
// FallbackSNI becomes the ServerName in a ClientHello if
// the original ServerName doesn't match any certificates
// in the cache. The use cases for this are very niche;
// typically if a client is a CDN and passes through the
// ServerName of the downstream handshake but can accept
// a certificate with the origin's hostname instead, then
// you would set this to your origin's hostname. Note that
// Caddy must be managing a certificate for this name.
//
// This feature is EXPERIMENTAL and subject to change or removal.
FallbackSNI string `json:"fallback_sni,omitempty"`
// Also known as "SSLKEYLOGFILE", TLS secrets will be written to
// this file in NSS key log format which can then be parsed by
// Wireshark and other tools. This is INSECURE as it allows other
// programs or tools to decrypt TLS connections. However, this
// capability can be useful for debugging and troubleshooting.
// **ENABLING THIS LOG COMPROMISES SECURITY!**
//
// This feature is EXPERIMENTAL and subject to change or removal.
InsecureSecretsLog string `json:"insecure_secrets_log,omitempty"`
// TLSConfig is the fully-formed, standard lib TLS config
// used to serve TLS connections. Provision all
// ConnectionPolicies to populate this. It is exported only
// so it can be minimally adjusted after provisioning
// if necessary (like to adjust NextProtos to disable HTTP/2),
// and may be unexported in the future.
TLSConfig *tls.Config `json:"-"`
matchers []ConnectionMatcher
}
func (p *ConnectionPolicy) buildStandardTLSConfig(ctx caddy.Context) error {
tlsAppIface, err := ctx.App("tls")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("getting tls app: %v", err)
}
tlsApp := tlsAppIface.(*TLS)
// fill in some "easy" default values, but for other values
// (such as slices), we should ensure that they start empty
// so the user-provided config can fill them in; then we will
// fill in a default config at the end if they are still unset
cfg := &tls.Config{
NextProtos: p.ALPN,
GetCertificate: func(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
// TODO: I don't love how this works: we pre-build certmagic configs
// so that handshakes are faster. Unfortunately, certmagic configs are
// comprised of settings from both a TLS connection policy and a TLS
// automation policy. The only two fields (as of March 2020; v2 beta 17)
// of a certmagic config that come from the TLS connection policy are
// CertSelection and DefaultServerName, so an automation policy is what
// builds the base certmagic config. Since the pre-built config is
// shared, I don't think we can change any of its fields per-handshake,
// hence the awkward shallow copy (dereference) here and the subsequent
// changing of some of its fields. I'm worried this dereference allocates
// more at handshake-time, but I don't know how to practically pre-build
// a certmagic config for each combination of conn policy + automation policy...
cfg := *tlsApp.getConfigForName(hello.ServerName)
if p.CertSelection != nil {
// you would think we could just set this whether or not
// p.CertSelection is nil, but that leads to panics if
// it is, because cfg.CertSelection is an interface,
// so it will have a non-nil value even if the actual
// value underlying it is nil (sigh)
cfg.CertSelection = p.CertSelection
}
cfg.DefaultServerName = p.DefaultSNI
cfg.FallbackServerName = p.FallbackSNI
return cfg.GetCertificate(hello)
},
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
MaxVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
}
// session tickets support
if tlsApp.SessionTickets != nil {
cfg.SessionTicketsDisabled = tlsApp.SessionTickets.Disabled
// session ticket key rotation
tlsApp.SessionTickets.register(cfg)
ctx.OnCancel(func() {
// do cleanup when the context is canceled because,
// though unlikely, it is possible that a context
// needing a TLS server config could exist for less
// than the lifetime of the whole app
tlsApp.SessionTickets.unregister(cfg)
})
}
// TODO: Clean up session ticket active locks in storage if app (or process) is being closed!
// add all the cipher suites in order, without duplicates
cipherSuitesAdded := make(map[uint16]struct{})
for _, csName := range p.CipherSuites {
csID := CipherSuiteID(csName)
if csID == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported cipher suite: %s", csName)
}
if _, ok := cipherSuitesAdded[csID]; !ok {
cipherSuitesAdded[csID] = struct{}{}
cfg.CipherSuites = append(cfg.CipherSuites, csID)
}
}
// add all the curve preferences in order, without duplicates
curvesAdded := make(map[tls.CurveID]struct{})
for _, curveName := range p.Curves {
curveID := SupportedCurves[curveName]
if _, ok := curvesAdded[curveID]; !ok {
curvesAdded[curveID] = struct{}{}
cfg.CurvePreferences = append(cfg.CurvePreferences, curveID)
}
}
// ensure ALPN includes the ACME TLS-ALPN protocol
var alpnFound bool
for _, a := range p.ALPN {
if a == acmez.ACMETLS1Protocol {
alpnFound = true
break
}
}
if !alpnFound && (cfg.NextProtos == nil || len(cfg.NextProtos) > 0) {
cfg.NextProtos = append(cfg.NextProtos, acmez.ACMETLS1Protocol)
}
// min and max protocol versions
if (p.ProtocolMin != "" && p.ProtocolMax != "") && p.ProtocolMin > p.ProtocolMax {
return fmt.Errorf("protocol min (%x) cannot be greater than protocol max (%x)", p.ProtocolMin, p.ProtocolMax)
}
if p.ProtocolMin != "" {
cfg.MinVersion = SupportedProtocols[p.ProtocolMin]
}
if p.ProtocolMax != "" {
cfg.MaxVersion = SupportedProtocols[p.ProtocolMax]
}
// client authentication
if p.ClientAuthentication != nil {
if err := p.ClientAuthentication.provision(ctx); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("provisioning client CA: %v", err)
}
if err := p.ClientAuthentication.ConfigureTLSConfig(cfg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configuring TLS client authentication: %v", err)
}
}
if p.InsecureSecretsLog != "" {
filename, err := caddy.NewReplacer().ReplaceOrErr(p.InsecureSecretsLog, true, true)
if err != nil {
return err
}
filename, err = filepath.Abs(filename)
if err != nil {
return err
}
logFile, _, err := secretsLogPool.LoadOrNew(filename, func() (caddy.Destructor, error) {
w, err := os.OpenFile(filename, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND, 0o600)
return destructableWriter{w}, err
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
ctx.OnCancel(func() { _, _ = secretsLogPool.Delete(filename) })
cfg.KeyLogWriter = logFile.(io.Writer)
if c := tlsApp.logger.Check(zapcore.WarnLevel, "TLS SECURITY COMPROMISED: secrets logging is enabled!"); c != nil {
c.Write(zap.String("log_filename", filename))
}
}
setDefaultTLSParams(cfg)
p.TLSConfig = cfg
return nil
}
// SettingsEmpty returns true if p's settings (fields
// except the matchers) are all empty/unset.
func (p ConnectionPolicy) SettingsEmpty() bool {
return p.CertSelection == nil &&
p.CipherSuites == nil &&
p.Curves == nil &&
p.ALPN == nil &&
p.ProtocolMin == "" &&
p.ProtocolMax == "" &&
p.ClientAuthentication == nil &&
p.DefaultSNI == "" &&
p.InsecureSecretsLog == ""
}
// UnmarshalCaddyfile sets up the ConnectionPolicy from Caddyfile tokens. Syntax:
//
// connection_policy {
// alpn <values...>
// cert_selection {
// ...
// }
// ciphers <cipher_suites...>
// client_auth {
// ...
// }
// curves <curves...>
// default_sni <server_name>
// match {
// ...
// }
// protocols <min> [<max>]
// # EXPERIMENTAL:
// drop
// fallback_sni <server_name>
// insecure_secrets_log <log_file>
// }
func (cp *ConnectionPolicy) UnmarshalCaddyfile(d *caddyfile.Dispenser) error {
_, wrapper := d.Next(), d.Val()
// No same-line options are supported
if d.CountRemainingArgs() > 0 {
return d.ArgErr()
}
var hasCertSelection, hasClientAuth, hasDefaultSNI, hasDrop,
hasFallbackSNI, hasInsecureSecretsLog, hasMatch, hasProtocols bool
for nesting := d.Nesting(); d.NextBlock(nesting); {
optionName := d.Val()
switch optionName {
case "alpn":
if d.CountRemainingArgs() == 0 {
return d.ArgErr()
}
cp.ALPN = append(cp.ALPN, d.RemainingArgs()...)
case "cert_selection":
if hasCertSelection {
return d.Errf("duplicate %s option '%s'", wrapper, optionName)
}
p := &CustomCertSelectionPolicy{}
if err := p.UnmarshalCaddyfile(d.NewFromNextSegment()); err != nil {
return err
}
cp.CertSelection, hasCertSelection = p, true
case "client_auth":
if hasClientAuth {
return d.Errf("duplicate %s option '%s'", wrapper, optionName)
}
ca := &ClientAuthentication{}
if err := ca.UnmarshalCaddyfile(d.NewFromNextSegment()); err != nil {
return err
}
cp.ClientAuthentication, hasClientAuth = ca, true
case "ciphers":
if d.CountRemainingArgs() == 0 {
return d.ArgErr()
}
cp.CipherSuites = append(cp.CipherSuites, d.RemainingArgs()...)
case "curves":
if d.CountRemainingArgs() == 0 {
return d.ArgErr()
}
cp.Curves = append(cp.Curves, d.RemainingArgs()...)
case "default_sni":
if hasDefaultSNI {
return d.Errf("duplicate %s option '%s'", wrapper, optionName)
}
if d.CountRemainingArgs() != 1 {
return d.ArgErr()
}
_, cp.DefaultSNI, hasDefaultSNI = d.NextArg(), d.Val(), true
case "drop": // EXPERIMENTAL
if hasDrop {
return d.Errf("duplicate %s option '%s'", wrapper, optionName)
}
cp.Drop, hasDrop = true, true
case "fallback_sni": // EXPERIMENTAL
if hasFallbackSNI {
return d.Errf("duplicate %s option '%s'", wrapper, optionName)
}
if d.CountRemainingArgs() != 1 {
return d.ArgErr()
}
_, cp.FallbackSNI, hasFallbackSNI = d.NextArg(), d.Val(), true
case "insecure_secrets_log": // EXPERIMENTAL
if hasInsecureSecretsLog {
return d.Errf("duplicate %s option '%s'", wrapper, optionName)
}
if d.CountRemainingArgs() != 1 {
return d.ArgErr()
}
_, cp.InsecureSecretsLog, hasInsecureSecretsLog = d.NextArg(), d.Val(), true
case "match":
if hasMatch {
return d.Errf("duplicate %s option '%s'", wrapper, optionName)
}
matcherSet, err := ParseCaddyfileNestedMatcherSet(d)
if err != nil {
return err
}
cp.MatchersRaw, hasMatch = matcherSet, true
case "protocols":
if hasProtocols {
return d.Errf("duplicate %s option '%s'", wrapper, optionName)
}
if d.CountRemainingArgs() == 0 || d.CountRemainingArgs() > 2 {
return d.ArgErr()
}
_, cp.ProtocolMin, hasProtocols = d.NextArg(), d.Val(), true
if d.NextArg() {
cp.ProtocolMax = d.Val()
}
default:
return d.ArgErr()
}
// No nested blocks are supported
if d.NextBlock(nesting + 1) {
return d.Errf("malformed %s option '%s': blocks are not supported", wrapper, optionName)
}
}
return nil
}
// ClientAuthentication configures TLS client auth.
type ClientAuthentication struct {
// Certificate authority module which provides the certificate pool of trusted certificates
CARaw json.RawMessage `json:"ca,omitempty" caddy:"namespace=tls.ca_pool.source inline_key=provider"`
ca CA
// DEPRECATED: Use the `ca` field with the `tls.ca_pool.source.inline` module instead.
// A list of base64 DER-encoded CA certificates
// against which to validate client certificates.
// Client certs which are not signed by any of
// these CAs will be rejected.
TrustedCACerts []string `json:"trusted_ca_certs,omitempty"`
// DEPRECATED: Use the `ca` field with the `tls.ca_pool.source.file` module instead.
// TrustedCACertPEMFiles is a list of PEM file names
// from which to load certificates of trusted CAs.
// Client certificates which are not signed by any of
// these CA certificates will be rejected.
TrustedCACertPEMFiles []string `json:"trusted_ca_certs_pem_files,omitempty"`
// DEPRECATED: This field is deprecated and will be removed in
// a future version. Please use the `validators` field instead
// with the tls.client_auth.verifier.leaf module instead.
//
// A list of base64 DER-encoded client leaf certs
// to accept. If this list is not empty, client certs
// which are not in this list will be rejected.
TrustedLeafCerts []string `json:"trusted_leaf_certs,omitempty"`
// Client certificate verification modules. These can perform
// custom client authentication checks, such as ensuring the
// certificate is not revoked.
VerifiersRaw []json.RawMessage `json:"verifiers,omitempty" caddy:"namespace=tls.client_auth.verifier inline_key=verifier"`
verifiers []ClientCertificateVerifier
// The mode for authenticating the client. Allowed values are:
//
// Mode | Description
// -----|---------------
// `request` | Ask clients for a certificate, but allow even if there isn't one; do not verify it
// `require` | Require clients to present a certificate, but do not verify it
// `verify_if_given` | Ask clients for a certificate; allow even if there isn't one, but verify it if there is
// `require_and_verify` | Require clients to present a valid certificate that is verified
//
// The default mode is `require_and_verify` if any
// TrustedCACerts or TrustedCACertPEMFiles or TrustedLeafCerts
// are provided; otherwise, the default mode is `require`.
Mode string `json:"mode,omitempty"`
existingVerifyPeerCert func([][]byte, [][]*x509.Certificate) error
}
// UnmarshalCaddyfile parses the Caddyfile segment to set up the client authentication. Syntax:
//
// client_auth {
// mode [request|require|verify_if_given|require_and_verify]
// trust_pool <module> {
// ...
// }
// trusted_leaf_cert <base64_der>
// trusted_leaf_cert_file <filename>
// verifier <module>
// }
//
// If `mode` is not provided, it defaults to `require_and_verify` if any of the following are provided:
// - `trusted_leaf_certs`
// - `trusted_leaf_cert_file`
// - `trust_pool`
//
// Otherwise, it defaults to `require`.
func (ca *ClientAuthentication) UnmarshalCaddyfile(d *caddyfile.Dispenser) error {
for d.NextArg() {
// consume any tokens on the same line, if any.
}
for nesting := d.Nesting(); d.NextBlock(nesting); {
subdir := d.Val()
switch subdir {
case "mode":
if d.CountRemainingArgs() > 1 {
return d.ArgErr()
}
if !d.Args(&ca.Mode) {
return d.ArgErr()
}
case "trusted_ca_cert":
caddy.Log().Warn("The 'trusted_ca_cert' field is deprecated. Use the 'trust_pool' field instead.")
if len(ca.CARaw) != 0 {
return d.Err("cannot specify both 'trust_pool' and 'trusted_ca_cert' or 'trusted_ca_cert_file'")
}
if !d.NextArg() {
return d.ArgErr()
}
ca.TrustedCACerts = append(ca.TrustedCACerts, d.Val())
case "trusted_leaf_cert":
if !d.NextArg() {
return d.ArgErr()
}
ca.TrustedLeafCerts = append(ca.TrustedLeafCerts, d.Val())
case "trusted_ca_cert_file":
caddy.Log().Warn("The 'trusted_ca_cert_file' field is deprecated. Use the 'trust_pool' field instead.")
if len(ca.CARaw) != 0 {
return d.Err("cannot specify both 'trust_pool' and 'trusted_ca_cert' or 'trusted_ca_cert_file'")
}
if !d.NextArg() {
return d.ArgErr()
}
filename := d.Val()
ders, err := convertPEMFilesToDER(filename)
if err != nil {
return d.WrapErr(err)
}
ca.TrustedCACerts = append(ca.TrustedCACerts, ders...)
case "trusted_leaf_cert_file":
if !d.NextArg() {
return d.ArgErr()
}
filename := d.Val()
ders, err := convertPEMFilesToDER(filename)
if err != nil {
return d.WrapErr(err)
}
ca.TrustedLeafCerts = append(ca.TrustedLeafCerts, ders...)
case "trust_pool":
if len(ca.TrustedCACerts) != 0 {
return d.Err("cannot specify both 'trust_pool' and 'trusted_ca_cert' or 'trusted_ca_cert_file'")
}
if !d.NextArg() {
return d.ArgErr()
}
modName := d.Val()
mod, err := caddyfile.UnmarshalModule(d, "tls.ca_pool.source."+modName)
if err != nil {
return d.WrapErr(err)
}
caMod, ok := mod.(CA)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("trust_pool module '%s' is not a certificate pool provider", caMod)
}
ca.CARaw = caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(caMod, "provider", modName, nil)
case "verifier":
if !d.NextArg() {
return d.ArgErr()
}
vType := d.Val()
modID := "tls.client_auth.verifier." + vType
unm, err := caddyfile.UnmarshalModule(d, modID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, ok := unm.(ClientCertificateVerifier)
if !ok {
return d.Errf("module '%s' is not a caddytls.ClientCertificateVerifier", modID)
}
ca.VerifiersRaw = append(ca.VerifiersRaw, caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(unm, "verifier", vType, nil))
default:
return d.Errf("unknown subdirective for client_auth: %s", subdir)
}
}
// only trust_ca_cert or trust_ca_cert_file was specified
if len(ca.TrustedCACerts) > 0 {
fileMod := &InlineCAPool{}
fileMod.TrustedCACerts = append(fileMod.TrustedCACerts, ca.TrustedCACerts...)
ca.CARaw = caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(fileMod, "provider", "inline", nil)
ca.TrustedCACertPEMFiles, ca.TrustedCACerts = nil, nil
}
return nil
}
func convertPEMFilesToDER(filename string) ([]string, error) {
certDataPEM, err := os.ReadFile(filename)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var ders []string
// while block is not nil, we have more certificates in the file
for block, rest := pem.Decode(certDataPEM); block != nil; block, rest = pem.Decode(rest) {
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no CERTIFICATE pem block found in %s", filename)
}
ders = append(
ders,
base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(block.Bytes),
)
}
// if we decoded nothing, return an error
if len(ders) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no CERTIFICATE pem block found in %s", filename)
}
return ders, nil
}
func (clientauth *ClientAuthentication) provision(ctx caddy.Context) error {
if len(clientauth.CARaw) > 0 && (len(clientauth.TrustedCACerts) > 0 || len(clientauth.TrustedCACertPEMFiles) > 0) {
return fmt.Errorf("conflicting config for client authentication trust CA")
}
// convert all named file paths to inline
if len(clientauth.TrustedCACertPEMFiles) > 0 {
for _, fpath := range clientauth.TrustedCACertPEMFiles {
ders, err := convertPEMFilesToDER(fpath)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
clientauth.TrustedCACerts = append(clientauth.TrustedCACerts, ders...)
}
}
// if we have TrustedCACerts explicitly set, create an 'inline' CA and return
if len(clientauth.TrustedCACerts) > 0 {
clientauth.ca = InlineCAPool{
TrustedCACerts: clientauth.TrustedCACerts,
}
return nil
}
// if we don't have any CARaw set, there's not much work to do
if clientauth.CARaw == nil {
return nil
}
caRaw, err := ctx.LoadModule(clientauth, "CARaw")
if err != nil {
return err
}
ca, ok := caRaw.(CA)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("'ca' module '%s' is not a certificate pool provider", ca)
}
clientauth.ca = ca
return nil
}
// Active returns true if clientauth has an actionable configuration.
func (clientauth ClientAuthentication) Active() bool {
return len(clientauth.TrustedCACerts) > 0 ||
len(clientauth.TrustedCACertPEMFiles) > 0 ||
len(clientauth.TrustedLeafCerts) > 0 || // TODO: DEPRECATED
len(clientauth.VerifiersRaw) > 0 ||
len(clientauth.Mode) > 0 ||
clientauth.CARaw != nil || clientauth.ca != nil
}
// ConfigureTLSConfig sets up cfg to enforce clientauth's configuration.
func (clientauth *ClientAuthentication) ConfigureTLSConfig(cfg *tls.Config) error {
// if there's no actionable client auth, simply disable it
if !clientauth.Active() {
cfg.ClientAuth = tls.NoClientCert
return nil
}
// enforce desired mode of client authentication
if len(clientauth.Mode) > 0 {
switch clientauth.Mode {
case "request":
cfg.ClientAuth = tls.RequestClientCert
case "require":
cfg.ClientAuth = tls.RequireAnyClientCert
case "verify_if_given":
cfg.ClientAuth = tls.VerifyClientCertIfGiven
case "require_and_verify":
cfg.ClientAuth = tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert
default:
return fmt.Errorf("client auth mode not recognized: %s", clientauth.Mode)
}
} else {
// otherwise, set a safe default mode
if len(clientauth.TrustedCACerts) > 0 ||
len(clientauth.TrustedCACertPEMFiles) > 0 ||
len(clientauth.TrustedLeafCerts) > 0 ||
clientauth.CARaw != nil {
cfg.ClientAuth = tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert
} else {
cfg.ClientAuth = tls.RequireAnyClientCert
}
}
// enforce CA verification by adding CA certs to the ClientCAs pool
if clientauth.ca != nil {
cfg.ClientCAs = clientauth.ca.CertPool()
}
// TODO: DEPRECATED: Only here for backwards compatibility.
// If leaf cert is specified, enforce by adding a client auth module
if len(clientauth.TrustedLeafCerts) > 0 {
caddy.Log().Named("tls.connection_policy").Warn("trusted_leaf_certs is deprecated; use leaf verifier module instead")
var trustedLeafCerts []*x509.Certificate
for _, clientCertString := range clientauth.TrustedLeafCerts {
clientCert, err := decodeBase64DERCert(clientCertString)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parsing certificate: %v", err)
}
trustedLeafCerts = append(trustedLeafCerts, clientCert)
}
clientauth.verifiers = append(clientauth.verifiers, LeafCertClientAuth{trustedLeafCerts: trustedLeafCerts})
}
// if a custom verification function already exists, wrap it
clientauth.existingVerifyPeerCert = cfg.VerifyPeerCertificate
cfg.VerifyPeerCertificate = clientauth.verifyPeerCertificate
return nil
}
// verifyPeerCertificate is for use as a tls.Config.VerifyPeerCertificate
// callback to do custom client certificate verification. It is intended
// for installation only by clientauth.ConfigureTLSConfig().
func (clientauth *ClientAuthentication) verifyPeerCertificate(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
// first use any pre-existing custom verification function
if clientauth.existingVerifyPeerCert != nil {
err := clientauth.existingVerifyPeerCert(rawCerts, verifiedChains)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, verifier := range clientauth.verifiers {
err := verifier.VerifyClientCertificate(rawCerts, verifiedChains)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// decodeBase64DERCert base64-decodes, then DER-decodes, certStr.
func decodeBase64DERCert(certStr string) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
derBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(certStr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return x509.ParseCertificate(derBytes)
}
// setDefaultTLSParams sets the default TLS cipher suites, protocol versions,
// and server preferences of cfg if they are not already set; it does not
// overwrite values, only fills in missing values.
func setDefaultTLSParams(cfg *tls.Config) {
if len(cfg.CipherSuites) == 0 {
cfg.CipherSuites = getOptimalDefaultCipherSuites()
}
// Not a cipher suite, but still important for mitigating protocol downgrade attacks
// (prepend since having it at end breaks http2 due to non-h2-approved suites before it)
cfg.CipherSuites = append([]uint16{tls.TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV}, cfg.CipherSuites...)
if len(cfg.CurvePreferences) == 0 {
// We would want to write
//
// cfg.CurvePreferences = defaultCurves
//
// but that would disable the post-quantum key agreement X25519Kyber768
// supported in Go 1.23, for which the CurveID is not exported.
// Instead, we'll set CurvePreferences to nil, which will enable PQC.
// See https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/6540
cfg.CurvePreferences = nil
}
if cfg.MinVersion == 0 {
cfg.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS12
}
if cfg.MaxVersion == 0 {
cfg.MaxVersion = tls.VersionTLS13
}
}
// LeafCertClientAuth verifies the client's leaf certificate.
type LeafCertClientAuth struct {
LeafCertificateLoadersRaw []json.RawMessage `json:"leaf_certs_loaders,omitempty" caddy:"namespace=tls.leaf_cert_loader inline_key=loader"`
trustedLeafCerts []*x509.Certificate
}
// CaddyModule returns the Caddy module information.
func (LeafCertClientAuth) CaddyModule() caddy.ModuleInfo {
return caddy.ModuleInfo{
ID: "tls.client_auth.verifier.leaf",
New: func() caddy.Module { return new(LeafCertClientAuth) },
}
}
func (l *LeafCertClientAuth) Provision(ctx caddy.Context) error {
if l.LeafCertificateLoadersRaw == nil {
return nil
}
val, err := ctx.LoadModule(l, "LeafCertificateLoadersRaw")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not parse leaf certificates loaders: %s", err.Error())
}
trustedLeafCertloaders := []LeafCertificateLoader{}
for _, loader := range val.([]any) {
trustedLeafCertloaders = append(trustedLeafCertloaders, loader.(LeafCertificateLoader))
}
trustedLeafCertificates := []*x509.Certificate{}
for _, loader := range trustedLeafCertloaders {
certs, err := loader.LoadLeafCertificates()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not load leaf certificates: %s", err.Error())
}
trustedLeafCertificates = append(trustedLeafCertificates, certs...)
}
l.trustedLeafCerts = trustedLeafCertificates
return nil
}
func (l LeafCertClientAuth) VerifyClientCertificate(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
if len(rawCerts) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("no client certificate provided")
}
remoteLeafCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCerts[0])
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("can't parse the given certificate: %s", err.Error())
}
for _, trustedLeafCert := range l.trustedLeafCerts {
if remoteLeafCert.Equal(trustedLeafCert) {
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("client leaf certificate failed validation")
}
// PublicKeyAlgorithm is a JSON-unmarshalable wrapper type.
type PublicKeyAlgorithm x509.PublicKeyAlgorithm
// UnmarshalJSON satisfies json.Unmarshaler.
func (a *PublicKeyAlgorithm) UnmarshalJSON(b []byte) error {
algoStr := strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(string(b), `"`))
algo, ok := publicKeyAlgorithms[algoStr]
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("unrecognized public key algorithm: %s (expected one of %v)",
algoStr, publicKeyAlgorithms)
}
*a = PublicKeyAlgorithm(algo)
return nil
}
// ConnectionMatcher is a type which matches TLS handshakes.
type ConnectionMatcher interface {
Match(*tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool
}
// LeafCertificateLoader is a type that loads the trusted leaf certificates
// for the tls.leaf_cert_loader modules
type LeafCertificateLoader interface {
LoadLeafCertificates() ([]*x509.Certificate, error)
}
// ClientCertificateVerifier is a type which verifies client certificates.
// It is called during verifyPeerCertificate in the TLS handshake.
type ClientCertificateVerifier interface {
VerifyClientCertificate(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error
}
var defaultALPN = []string{"h2", "http/1.1"}
type destructableWriter struct{ *os.File }
func (d destructableWriter) Destruct() error { return d.Close() }
var secretsLogPool = caddy.NewUsagePool()
// Interface guards
var (
_ caddyfile.Unmarshaler = (*ClientAuthentication)(nil)
_ caddyfile.Unmarshaler = (*ConnectionPolicy)(nil)
)
// ParseCaddyfileNestedMatcherSet parses the Caddyfile tokens for a nested
// matcher set, and returns its raw module map value.
func ParseCaddyfileNestedMatcherSet(d *caddyfile.Dispenser) (caddy.ModuleMap, error) {
matcherMap := make(map[string]ConnectionMatcher)
tokensByMatcherName := make(map[string][]caddyfile.Token)
for nesting := d.Nesting(); d.NextArg() || d.NextBlock(nesting); {
matcherName := d.Val()
tokensByMatcherName[matcherName] = append(tokensByMatcherName[matcherName], d.NextSegment()...)
}
for matcherName, tokens := range tokensByMatcherName {
dd := caddyfile.NewDispenser(tokens)
dd.Next() // consume wrapper name
unm, err := caddyfile.UnmarshalModule(dd, "tls.handshake_match."+matcherName)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cm, ok := unm.(ConnectionMatcher)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("matcher module '%s' is not a connection matcher", matcherName)
}
matcherMap[matcherName] = cm
}
matcherSet := make(caddy.ModuleMap)
for name, matcher := range matcherMap {
jsonBytes, err := json.Marshal(matcher)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshaling %T matcher: %v", matcher, err)
}
matcherSet[name] = jsonBytes
}
return matcherSet, nil
}